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Abstract 
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workplace has been rising in Britain and New Zealand.  Social custom, union 
instrumentality, the fixed costs of joining, employee perceptions of management attitudes 
to unionization and employee problems at work all influence the propensity to free-ride. 
Ideological convictions regarding the role of unions also play some role, as do private 
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Introduction 
 
Since the early 1990s, compulsory union membership – the ‘closed shop’ – has been 
unlawful in Britain and New Zealand, so that joining a union has become a matter of 
individual choice. Membership density has declined in unionized workplaces in both 
countries since the legislative change, indicating a rise in ‘free-riding’. In both countries, 
although there is evidence of free-riding prior to the legislative changes, the practice 
increased markedly in the 1990s (Table 1 presents data for Britain; Haynes and Boxall, 2004 
discuss trends in New Zealand).  
Free-riding has become a serious problem for trade unions since, as voluntary membership 
organisations, they are reliant on union subscriptions for their financial survival. Yet many of 
the services unions provide, such as higher wages and better terms and conditions, are public 
or collective goods available to members and non-members alike, creating an incentive for 
individuals to opt out of union membership, that is, to free-ride. 
The policy response to increased free-riding from the governments in both countries has 
been very different. In Britain, concern that employer opposition to unions denies workers 
their rights to organise has resulted in statutory support for union recognition where a 
majority of workers in a bargaining unit wish for it (Wood, Moore, and Ewing 2003), but 
there is little concern about free-riding where a union is already established. In New Zealand, 
on the other hand, parliament legislated in 2004 to allow for agency fees in labor-
management contracts, potentially requiring non-members to pay for the service they receive 
from unions, even if they choose to remain non-members – what is often referred to as an 
‘agency shop’ (Haynes and Boxall 2004).1 
This paper uses unique comparable data for Britain and New Zealand to explore the 
reasons given for free-riding, and to identify how free-riders differ from union members. We 
find social custom, union instrumentality, the fixed costs of joining, employee perceptions of 
management attitudes to unionization and employee problems at work all influence the 
propensity to free-ride. Ideological convictions regarding the role of unions also play some 
role, as do private excludable goods. There is little indication of employer-inspired policies 
substituting for unionization where unions are already present. 
We begin by outlining the theory informing our understanding of union free-riding. We 
then introduce the data, establish the incidence of free-riding in both countries and describe 
the reasons individuals give for not joining a union when one is available to them. 
Multivariate analyses are used to isolate the factors associated with free-riding, comparing 
and contrasting those factors across the two countries. The conclusions discuss the 
implications of the analysis for unions. 
 
 
Theory and Evidence on Union Free-Riding 
 
Since the wages, terms and conditions arising from union collective bargaining accrue to 
members and non-members alike, Olson (1965) argued that unions can only overcome the 
incentive to free-ride if membership is compulsory, or if the union can offer private incentive 
goods or services to its members. There is a strong association between closed shop 
arrangements and high union membership density. For instance, in 1984, workplace-level 
union density in British establishments where unions were recognised for pay bargaining was 
                                                 
1 This legislation is akin to the agency fee arrangements in place in the US in states other than the right-to-work 
states, though in some circumstances non-members may still opt out even after the arrangements have been 
negotiated.  See footnote 2 for the US. 
 2
87 percent in those with a closed shop agreement, 79 percent where management strongly 
recommended union membership but there was no closed shop agreement, and 55 percent 
where there was no closed shop or strong management support (Millward, Bryson, and Forth 
2000:149). Similarly, in the United States analyses of the Current Population Surveys reveal 
a free-rider rate in the private sector of 15 percent in states with right-to-work laws compared 
with 7.5 percent in states without right-to-work laws, figures that have remained fairly 
constant since the mid-1970s (Farber and Western 2001).2 The rise in free-riding in Britain 
and New Zealand since the end of the closed shop suggests that the legislation may have kept 
membership above the equilibrium rate that obtains where supply meets demand.3 
Unions continue to generate public goods. Towards the end of the 1990s, non-members in 
union covered British workplaces benefited substantially from positive ‘spillover’ effects in 
terms of a wage premium and non-wage fringe benefits, creating incentives to free-ride 
(Forth and Millward 2002). In the new open-shop environment, where workers can choose 
whether or not to purchase membership on the basis of the net benefits accruing to them from 
doing so, the onus is on unions to ‘privatize’ the flow of amenities associated with 
membership. Private excludable goods have always been part of what unions had to offer. 
They include job security (Moreton 1998, 1999), professional indemnity insurance, access to 
union advice and representation in grievance and disciplinary matters, and influence over 
staffing arrangements and physical conditions. There is empirical support for the notion that 
private excludable goods of this type are correlated with union density among manual 
workers in Britain (Booth and Chatterji 1995). 
Olson (1965) conceived of the decision to join a trade union as a function of an 
individual’s appraisal of the financial costs and benefits. As the percentage of fellow workers 
joining the union rises, the damage the individual might do to the provision of collective 
goods by free-riding falls, thus strengthening the incentive to free-ride.  However, Booth 
(1985) has argued that the ‘reputation’ an individual derives from membership is an 
important aspect of the private excludable good unions have to offer. This reputation effect is 
the utility individuals derive from complying with the social custom of membership, a utility 
first identified by Akerlof (1980:749) when he defined social custom as ‘an act whose utility 
to the agent performing it in some way depends on the beliefs or actions of other members of 
the community’. Under the social custom model, peer choices help determine the reputational 
cost or benefit from joining, so that joining decisions are interdependent. Contrary to Olson’s 
(1965) prediction, workers may be more prepared to join if others join since reputational 
benefits rise where the social custom is strong.4 The closed shop may have helped create the 
social custom of membership by setting membership as the ‘default’. Its removal altered the 
‘default’ position facing new workers entering an establishment such that, for the first time, 
whether to join became a decision based on the net benefits of membership. New entrants 
with marginal or no perceived benefits, by choosing not to join, began to shift the social 
                                                 
2 Right-to-work laws make mandatory union membership or dues collection illegal. In other states, workers in 
covered establishments must join the union or pay agency fees. Despite the density differential across right-to-
work and non-right-to-work states, some analyses indicate that the laws have little independent impact on 
density (Hirsch and Addison 1986). The differential may be driven, in part, by differences between right-to-
work and non-right-to-work states in orientations towards unionization that are not directly attributable to these 
differences in law. 
3 An alternative interpretation is that desire for union membership among workers in unionized workplaces has 
fallen in any event. The lack of data on the desire for unionization among non-members over time means we 
cannot test this proposition in the UK or New Zealand.  
4 In extensions of this model Naylor and Cripps (1993) show that, with heterogeneous worker tastes for 
reputation, stable union density between zero and 100 is a possible equilibrium outcome, with the equilibrium 
level determined, inter alia, by union membership costs, sensitivities to social custom and levels of strike pay. 
Naylor and Raaum (1993) also account for the role played by management opposition to unionization. 
 3
custom underpinning the reputation effects of joining. Over time, with declining membership, 
the reputational benefit (cost) of (not) joining the union has declined. Some social custom 
models of union joining posit a critical mass of membership, below which unionization is not 
viable. Under these conditions, reductions in membership caused by an exogenous shock, 
such as the removal of closed shop arrangements, may be persistent.  
Changes in union density also influence unions’ ability to generate collective goods 
through their bargaining power.5 Falling union density increases the price elasticity of union 
labour, other things equal, undermining union bargaining power. Consequently, although the 
marginal worker’s decision not to join the union may not directly affect union bargaining 
power, the interdependence of such decisions at workplace-level can result in declining union 
bargaining power over time, thus reducing the perceived benefits of union membership 
which, itself, reinforces decisions not to join. 
In addition to this economics literature, there is a literature drawing on social psychology 
and industrial relations that stresses three sorts of motive for union joining, namely problems 
at work that ‘trigger’ joining, such as job dissatisfaction or dissatisfaction with management; 
a belief that a union can be instrumental in tackling the problem; and political and ideological 
commitment predisposing an individual to solidaristic action to tackle perceived injustices.6 
Dissatisfaction is not a sufficient condition for participation in a union (Klandermans 1986) 
because unions need to be seen as instrumental in alleviating dissatisfaction in order to join 
(Kochan 1979). Even if unions do offer a means of addressing workplace problems, the 
presence of employer-generated substitutes, such as non-union voice mechanisms, may 
dissuade workers from paying for the additional support offered by a union. Fiorito (2001) 
and Bryson and Freeman (2005) find such policies do reduce the desire for unionization 
among non-union workers in the US, but these effects are absent in Britain (Bryson and 
Freeman, op. cit.).7  
This discussion suggests that free-riders differ from union members in a number of ways 
because the returns to membership are heterogeneous across workers. Free-riders: 
1. Are less likely to value the collective goods unions offer. For example, highly educated 
workers may be able to secure good terms and conditions due to their own high 
individual bargaining power. Younger workers with higher mobility may place a lower 
value than other workers on collective grievance representation. 
2. Are more likely to view unions as ineffectual. 
3. Face higher fixed costs of joining relative to their income or earnings. 
4. Face a low reputational cost from failing to join because union joining is not the default 
for their occupation or job class, or because they are located in workplaces with low or 
falling union density. 
5. Are less likely to benefit from private union excludable goods.  This may include low-
tenured workers who have invested less in their current jobs than high-tenured workers. 
                                                 
5 Hirsch and Schumacher (2001) and Stewart (1987) present empirical support for the link between higher union 
density and a higher union wage premium for the US and Britain respectively. 
6 For an exposition of the theory see Klandermans (1986). For reviews of the literature see Wheeler, Hoyt, and 
McClendon (1991) and McClendon, Wheeler, and Weikle (1998). For analyses testing hypotheses arising from 
this approach see Charlwood (2002, 2003) and Kelly (2005) for Britain and Macky, Boxall, and Haynes (2005) 
for New Zealand. Some, though by no means all, of the insights from this literature can be incorporated into the 
cost-benefit framework. For instance, one of the benefits from membership may be the psychological ‘pay-off’ 
of investing in solidaristic actions. See Schnabel (2003) for a discussion. 
7 Belfield and Heywood (2004) also tackle this issue with British data, but their investigation relates only to the 
desire for union representation on pay and combines non-members in the union and non-union sectors. Among 
this population, HRM practices identified by managerial respondents were generally not significantly associated 
with desire for union representation over pay. 
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6. Have little attachment to the solidaristic ideological principles underpinning unionism, 
perhaps exhibiting greater individualism and greater sensitivity towards employer 
opposition to unionization. 
7. Attach high value to union substitutes such as employer open-door policies. 
8. Have fewer needs, problems or dissatisfactions at work that might trigger joining. 
 
We return to these propositions in our empirical analysis. However, we do not formally 
test each proposition in search of causal linkages because our cross-sectional data do not 
permit this without making arbitrary assumptions about the direction of causation. Rather, we 
comment on independent correlations in the data. 
 
 
Data 
 
The analysis for Britain uses the British Worker Representation and Participation Survey 
2001 (BWRPS). The analysis for New Zealand uses its counterpart, the New Zealand Worker 
Representation and Participation Survey 2003 (NZWRPS). Details of key data items and 
their values are appended (Appendix Table A1). 
The BWRPS was conducted as part of the monthly BMRB Access Omnibus survey in 
June and July 2001. Interviews were conducted using face-to-face computer assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI) techniques. Of the 3,614 people interviewed, 1,355 were eligible to take 
part in the survey. Our analysis is confined to the 663 respondents who reported the presence 
of a union, or similar body such as a staff association, that people doing their sort of job can 
join. The weighting schema ensures that demographic profiles match those for all employees 
in Great Britain aged 15 or over. 
For NZWRPS, one thousand New Zealand workers, drawn randomly from residential 
telephone directories, were interviewed using computer assisted telephone interviewing 
(CATI) in January and February 2003. The sample was limited to New Zealand residents in 
paid employment of more than 10 hours per week and who had left secondary (high) school. 
Quotas for geographical regions reflected the spatial distribution of the population across the 
country as reported in the Household Labour Force Survey conducted by Statistics New 
Zealand. Although the sample was broadly representative, the data were weighted by 
occupation and industry to more closely fit the demographic characteristics of the total 
workforce. It is not possible to establish the eligibility of households who refused to answer 
the survey but the response rate is estimated as at least 48 percent (see Haynes, Boxall, and 
Macky 2003 for details of the survey). Our analysis is confined to the 451 respondents in 
workplaces with a union they could join. 
 
 
Empirical Approach 
 
These data allow a more precise identification of free-riders than is normally the case because 
they identify non-members who are eligible to join a trade union at their workplace, whereas 
most data sets simply identify the presence of a union or unions which the non-member may 
or may not be eligible to join.8 They also include detailed follow-up questions regarding 
                                                 
8 The question BWRPS asks: ‘Is there a union, or similar body such as a staff association, that represents 
employees to managers at your workplace and that people doing your sort of job can join?’ The NZWRPS asks, 
‘Is there a union of any kind at your workplace?’ and, if there is, ‘Is it a union that people doing your sort of job 
can join?’ 
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individuals’ decisions not to join a union, permitting a better understanding of why 
employees choose to free-ride.  
In the next section we identify the incidence of free-riding in both countries and present 
descriptive information on the reasons given for choosing not to join the union. We use 
multivariate analyses to isolate independent associations between a range of variables and 
free-riding by estimating probit models for the probability of free-riding as a (0,1) outcome 
for those eligible to join a workplace union. Analyses for both countries are weighted to 
allow the results to be generalized to the population from which the sample is drawn.9 The 
main text presents marginal effects calculated at mean values for the estimation sample. Full 
models with probit coefficients are appended. 
Models are specified so as to be as comparable as possible across the two countries, both 
in terms of the set of covariates used and their precise specification. Controls include 
demographics (gender, age, ethnicity, education), job (hours, tenure with the employer, 
whether the job is considered ‘part of your long-term career’, managerial and supervisory 
status) and workplace characteristics (organisational size and public sector).10 There remain 
some differences in the specifications, most notably the use of banded gross pay in BWRPS, 
whereas NZWRPS contains banded personal pre-tax income. All control variables are 
described and mean values listed in the Data Appendix.  
Some of these variables are of interest in their own right given the theory outlined earlier. 
In particular we might expect the following relationships: 
 
1. Lower probabilities of free-riding with high tenure and among older workers. These 
workers are more likely to have entered the workplace at a time when closed shop 
provisions were still in place and the social custom of membership better established.  
Furthermore, they are likely to have poorer outside job options, which would increase the 
value they attach to private excludable goods such as individual grievance representation. 
2. Higher probabilities of free-riding among those with low wages, low hours and those 
who perceive their jobs as ‘non-career’ jobs, since the fixed costs of joining are relatively 
high for these workers. 
3. Higher probabilities of free-riding for the very well paid and highly qualified due to their 
relatively high bargaining power and better outside labour market opportunities. 
4. Higher probabilities of free-riding among occupations where union joining is not the 
custom, notably management, where the reputational cost of not joining is likely to be 
low. 
5. Lower probabilities of free-riding in public sector industries where the social custom of 
membership is strong and the gross benefits from membership are likely to be high, as in 
public administration and health. 
6. Higher probabilities of free-riding in larger organizations where the marginal effect of 
not joining on the provision of collective goods will be lowest. 
  
For some variables the theoretical propositions cut in different directions. For instance, 
point 2 above suggests higher probabilities of free-riding among those with low wages 
whereas point 3 suggests higher probabilities of free-riding among the higher-paid. Also, 
variables such as age and tenure are correlated. Thus the independent association between 
                                                 
9 Multivariate analyses run on unweighted data produce similar results to those reported here and are available 
from the author on request. 
10 If analyzed separately, richer models can be specified. For instance, the BWRPS contains a richer set of 
covariates including marital and parental status, region, local area characteristics, and workplace size. These 
fuller model specifications do not alter the main findings presented in the paper. These alternative specifications 
are available from the author on request.  
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each variable and free-riding is an empirical matter that can only be adequately explored with 
multivariate analyses. 
In addition to these ‘baseline’ characteristics we create measures capturing features of the 
individual, the workplace and the union that the literature review indicates are likely to affect 
the propensity to free-ride. These measures are described in detail in the Data Appendix. 
Although some derivations differ across the two surveys due to differences in survey design 
and institutional settings, the model specifications remain broadly comparable across the two 
countries. 
First, we identify the number of workplace needs that employees express. Both surveys 
asked workers about their satisfaction with the influence they had over workplace decisions, 
perceptions of management’s ability to deal with workplace issues, the presence of particular 
problems at work, and general workplace climate. Using identical or near-identical measures 
in both surveys, we coded responses to questions in these areas as 0/1 variables, where 0 
means no problem/need and 1 means a problem/need. We then summed these measures to 
obtain the total number of needs, with scores running from zero (no needs) to a maximum of 
13. This approach makes it relatively easy to compare the reported needs across the surveys. 
These needs may ‘trigger’ desire for unionization and so should be correlated with a greater 
desire for unionization among non-union workers. New Zealand’s employees had fewer 
needs than Britain’s: 43 percent of New Zealanders in unionized workplaces had no needs, 
compared to 36 percent of British workers in unionized workplaces. The mean scores were 
2.1 and 2.4 respectively.  However, non-members’ needs were similar across the two 
countries: non-members in both countries had a mean of 1.9 needs. Thus the needs ‘trigger’ 
for non-members to join their workplace union appears similar across the two countries.     
The second set of measures relate to union instrumentality. Where unions are perceived as 
instrumental in effecting change, this should reduce employees’ propensity to free-ride. 
Identical additive scales running from zero to six were constructed for both countries, with a 
union scoring ‘1’ on the effectiveness scale each time it was perceived as ‘excellent’ or 
‘good’ on six performance indicators. New Zealand’s employees were more likely than 
British employees to view the workplace union as effective, the mean scores being 3.4 and 
2.8 respectively. However, the difference was largely accounted for by members’ perceptions 
(mean scores of 4.1 and 3.1) rather than non-members’ (for whom the mean scores were 2.7 
and 2.4 respectively). 
The second union instrumentality measure is a dummy variable identifying workers who 
think things would be worse ‘if there was no union’ (at ‘your workplace’ in BWRPS and 
‘personally’ in NZWRPS). In both countries, 54 percent of employees gave this response. 
Once again, members in New Zealand seemed more certain of the benefits of unionization 
than members in Britain: 75 percent thought things would get worse in the absence of a 
union, compared to 66 percent of British members. Non-members gave similar responses 
across countries with 28 percent of New Zealand’s non-members saying things would get 
worse compared to 31 percent in Britain. 
On both union effectiveness measures New Zealand’s unions were perceived as more 
effective than Britain’s unions among their members, whereas non-members’ perceptions of 
union effectiveness did not differ very much across the two countries. The membership 
differential may indicate that New Zealand’s unions are relatively better at privatizing the 
returns to membership than their British counterparts. The privatization of these returns might 
explain why non-members do not observe union effectiveness to the same degree. 
Alternatively, non-members may recognize the private benefits of membership to current 
members but, for whatever reasons, do not think these benefits would accrue to them if they 
joined. 
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Third, our data contain potential union substitutes. Three of these - a joint consultative 
committee (JCC), a managerial ‘open door’ policy, and an HR department – are common to 
both surveys and so we concentrate on these in our main analyses. In our sample of 
employees in unionized workplaces, British workers were more likely than New Zealanders 
to be employed in a workplace with a JCC, whereas New Zealanders were more likely to 
identify an ‘open door’ policy and HR departments. 
In addition, BWRPS identifies the presence of formal grievance procedures and five types 
of performance-related payment. NZWRPS includes employee involvement programs, 
regular meetings between management and employees, and committees of employees. All of 
these have the potential to meet employee problems and needs, and thus reduce the desire for 
employees to join the union, so we shall also comment on their effects. 
Fourth, we include employee perceptions of managerial attitudes towards unionization 
since these can influence employees’ views as to the personal cost of joining the union and 
the prospects for a union making headway with an employer. Employees perceive greater 
managerial opposition to unions in New Zealand than they do in Britain, a perception that is 
shared by members and non-members alike. Ten percent of British employees in unionized 
workplaces thought managers were ‘opposed’ to unions, the figure being similar among 
members and non-members. In New Zealand, perceived management opposition to unions 
was more than twice as common, with 24 percent viewing managers as ‘opposed’ to unions. 
Furthermore, unlike Britain, non-members in New Zealand were more likely than members to 
view managers as opposed to unions (27 percent did so, compared to 21 percent of members). 
New Zealanders were also less likely than British workers to perceive management as being 
‘in favour’ of unions - 31 percent against 41 percent in Britain - a differential apparent among 
members and non-members, with New Zealand’s non-members least likely of all to view 
employers as favourable. 
The fifth set of measures captures individuals’ ideological orientation. These measures 
differ across the two surveys. BWRPS contains two measures of employees’ perceptions of 
unions in general. Conditioning on perceptions of union effectiveness at the workplace, 
positive perceptions of unions in general are considered an indicator of a general positive 
orientation towards unions and should increase the perceived net benefits of membership. 
Half (51 percent) of British employees in unionized workplaces strongly agreed that strong 
unions were needed to protect employees’ conditions and wages, the agreement rate being 
almost twice as high among members as among non-members (61 percent against 35 
percent). On the second measure, only around one-third (36 percent) of British employees in 
unionized workplaces strongly disagreed with the statement ‘trades unions are old 
fashioned/have no future in modern Britain’, the rate of disagreement being twice as high 
among members as non-members (44 percent compared to 22 percent). The NZWRPS 
measure of ideology is based on factor analysis of five political attitude statements which 
have been validated in other surveys. They are used to construct a “left-right” index which 
positions individuals on a political spectrum from left to right. The expectation is that those 
of a more leftward persuasion are more likely to support unions. Members were more to the 
“left” of the scale than non-members, as one might have anticipated.11  
Finally, NZWRPS asks: ‘About what proportion of employees in your workplace are in 
your union?’ with responses coded from ‘almost none’ through to ‘almost all/all’.  
Workplace-level union density can be a proxy for the social norm of union joining, and so 
may measure the reputational benefit of joining, a benefit which should rise with the 
percentage organized. On the other hand, from Olson’s perspective, the potential impact of 
                                                 
11 Other studies have identified an independent association between being on the left of this scale and union 
membership (Bryson and Gomez 2003). 
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not joining on public goods provision falls with rising membership, lowering the probability 
of joining. Which factor dominates is an empirical question. BWRPS does not contain a 
density measure. 
The modelling approach is to construct a ‘baseline’ model, then add and remove each 
block of additional variables described to test their effects conditional upon ‘baseline’ 
characteristics. In the final models all variables are entered together. Models are run on data 
pooled from both countries, with a New Zealand dummy identifying country effects over and 
above those accounted for in the model. Separate country models are also presented to 
establish how effects vary across the two countries. These analyses are run on 1,088 cases 
(646 for Britain and 442 for New Zealand), having dropped a small number of cases with 
missing data on education, hours or tenure and, for a small number of New Zealand cases, a 
missing weighting variable. 
 
 
The Incidence of Free-Riding  
 
Forty-five percent of New Zealanders employed in unionized workplaces are free-riders, that 
is, they are non-members working in a workplace with a union that they could join. This free-
riding rate in NZWRPS is 10 percentage points above the 35 percent among British 
employees in unionized workplaces. This differential is apparent across most types of 
employee, the exceptions being women, managers, non-supervisors, those with low tenure, 
and the small percentage of employees scoring highly on the union effectiveness scale (Table 
2).   
The gender difference in free-riding across the two countries is particularly striking.  In 
Britain, the incidence of free-riding is 13 percentage points higher among women than it is 
among men. In New Zealand, it is the other way round, the free-riding rate being 13 
percentage points higher for men than for women.   
The other striking difference relates to free-riding among managers and supervisors. In 
Britain, free-riding is more common among managers than among non-managers but is less 
common among supervisors than among those without supervisory responsibilities. In New 
Zealand, on the other hand, although the percentage point differences are smaller than for 
Britain, free-riding is more prevalent among non-managers than among managers, and among 
supervisors compared with non-supervisory workers. These differences may be accounted for 
by differences in survey questions across the two countries, as explained in the Data 
Appendix. 
In both countries, free-riding is most prevalent among younger workers but remains 
roughly constant once workers reach their mid-30s. It is lower among the more highly 
qualified, though the effects are not pronounced. Free-riding declines markedly with hours 
worked, with gross pay/income, with tenure and among those who perceive their jobs as 
‘career’ jobs. It is lower in the public sector and among those employed by larger 
organizations. 
In both countries, free-riding becomes less common among those employees with three or 
more needs, whereas there is little difference in free-riding between those with no needs and 
those with one or two needs. The rate of free-riding is associated with perceptions of union 
effectiveness, as noted earlier: it is much lower among those who think things would get 
worse without the union and drops with higher union effectiveness scores except among the 
small percentage scoring close to the top of the effectiveness scale. Perceptions of 
management attitudes towards unions are also associated with free-riding. The rate of free-
riding is lowest among those who think management ‘favours’ unions, but there is no 
difference in either country in the free-riding rates of those perceiving management to be 
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opposed and those who see management as ‘neutral’. The highest free-riding rates are among 
those who say they do not know management’s attitudes to unions or refuse to answer the 
question.   
Managerial policies and practices that might substitute for unions do not seem to be 
associated with free-riding: the free-riding rates in the presence of HR departments, open 
door policies and JCCs are close to the country averages. The exception is performance-
related payments: half of British employees in unionized workplaces using them are free-
riders. 
As anticipated, ideological support for the role of unions in general is associated with a 
lower incidence of free-riding, as is being on the “left” of the “left-right” scale in New 
Zealand. 
Finally, the percentage of New Zealand’s employees who say they are a non-member falls 
monotonically with what they believe is the rough proportion of employees who are union 
members at their workplace. Of course, there is a mechanistic relationship here: by definition, 
an employee is much less likely to be a non-member where all or nearly all the employees in 
the workplace are members. However, workplace density may also be correlated with the 
economic or reputational benefits of membership. 
 
 
Reasons Employees Give for Free-Riding  
 
Before moving on to establish which factors are independently associated with free-riding in 
multivariate analyses, we consider why workers choose not to join a union when there is a 
union available to them at their workplace. When interpreting responses it is worth bearing in 
mind that many non-members had never been confronted with the question by union 
organizers. Fifty-five percent of BWRPS non-members eligible to join a union at their 
workplace said they had never been asked to join the union.12 This is a serious organizing 
failure on the part of trade unions, since 36 percent said they would be ‘very’ or ‘quite’ likely 
to join if asked.   
BWRPS asks non-members how important four factors were in their ‘decision’ not to join 
the union at their workplace, using a four-point scale from ‘very important’ to ‘not at all 
important’. The chief reason given, mentioned as ‘very’ or ‘quite’ important by four-in-ten 
non-members, was that the ‘union does not achieve anything I value’, indicating the 
importance of perceived union instrumentality (Table 3, Panel A). The second most important 
reason, identified as such by one-third of non-members, was ‘I get all the benefits anyway’, a 
conscious recognition that they are free-riding on collective goods generated by the union.13 
One might have expected a negative correlation between these two factors in determining the 
decision not to join the union since the first statement implies that there are few, if any, 
benefits one might derive from membership. In fact, they are positively and significantly 
correlated (Table 3, Panel B). The price of joining was cited as important by 30 percent of 
non-members. A similar proportion cited ‘people doing my job just don’t join’, a clear 
indication of the importance of social customs and norms in the joining decision. 
One potential criticism of this approach is that there may be many reasons for not joining 
other than those offered in the questionnaire. In the event, over two-thirds of British non-
members (69 percent) cited at least one of the reasons as either ‘quite important’ or ‘very 
important’. However, 10 percent of non-members said all four reasons were ‘not at all 
                                                 
12 In NZWRPS, the question was only asked of non-members eligible to join a union at their workplace who had 
never belonged to a union (N = 63). Of these, 34 percent report that they had never been asked to join the union. 
13 Haynes and Boxall (2005) refer to these as “calculating” free-riders. 
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important’ so that, for a small minority, the question is not getting at their reasons for not 
joining. 
The NZWRPS information on reasons for not joining is different for two reasons.  First, 
the question asks non-members to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed with six 
statements given as ‘reasons why some people don’t belong to unions’.  Second, the question 
was filtered such that it was only asked of employees who had never been union members 
(‘never-members’, thus excluding those who had been members of a union at some time in 
the past). This severely restricted the numbers answering the question (unweighted N=65) 
and means the results cannot be extrapolated to all non-members in unionized workplaces. 
The responses are nevertheless informative and can be taken as indicative of the rank order of 
responses that non-members as a whole might give. The primary reason identified for not 
joining was that ‘I get all the benefits anyway’, a statement to which two-thirds (64 percent) 
of never-members agreed or strongly agreed. Next came ‘The union does not achieve 
anything I value’ and ‘People doing my job don’t join trade unions’, statements to which 
around two-fifths (44 and 43 percent respectively) of never-members agreed. A little over 
one-third (37 percent) agreed with the statements that ‘Membership fees are too high/too 
expensive’ and ‘Unions do not cooperate enough for the good of the workplace’. Last came 
the statement ‘I don’t believe in unions’, cited by 28 percent of never-members. 
Although the sample base and rating scales for the British and New Zealand questions are 
not comparable, these findings indicate that non-members tend to have multiple reasons for 
not joining a union, with ‘calculating’ free-riding, social norms, union instrumentality, the 
financial costs of joining and ideological motivations all playing a role. 
 
 
Factors Associated with Free-Riding 
 
We identify independent factors associated with free-riding using probit analyses as 
described earlier. The full models with probit coefficients are presented in the Data 
Appendix. Tables 1-5 in the text report changes in the estimated probability of being a free-
rider relating to various employee, job and workplace characteristics, arising from change in 
each independent, continuous variable and of switches in the value of discrete variables.  The 
marginal effects are evaluated at the mean characteristics of the estimation sample. 
Model (1) in Table 4, presented in full together with the other models in Appendix Table 
A2, contains all ‘baseline’ characteristics for employees in Britain and New Zealand. The 
adjusted Wald test indicates the variables are jointly significant (f(23,1065)=6.13, 
p>f=.0000). The increase in free-riding probabilities with shorter hours and low pay may be 
associated with the fixed pecuniary and effort costs attached to joining. The increased 
propensity for free-riding among managers relative to other employees is consistent with low 
reputational costs attached to not joining among those in managerial grades. As anticipated, 
older workers and those with long tenure have lower probabilities of free-riding, perhaps 
because they have fewer outside job opportunities than lower tenure and younger workers 
and, as such, are more likely to benefit from the private excludable goods available through 
the union, such as representation in grievance matters. It is also possible that, conditioning on 
tenure, age is capturing a cohort effect, with some of these older workers joining unions at a 
time when the closed shop was in force. The lower probability of free-riding in the public 
sector is consistent with the social custom of joining in the sector and with potentially higher 
returns to union membership in higher density sectors. Similar interpretations might apply to 
the lower probability of free-riding in larger organisations since these are known to have 
higher union density. There is no support for Olson’s contention that free-riding will be more 
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prevalent in larger organizations since the marginal effect of free-riding on the production of 
collective goods will be less apparent. 
Controlling for the ‘baseline’ characteristics, higher needs are associated with a lower 
probability of free-riding (Model (2)). So too is perceived union instrumentality (Model (3)).  
The marginal effect of believing that things would be worse in the absence of the union is 
particularly large, reducing the probability of free-riding by 31 percent for individuals with 
mean characteristics for the sample. Perceptions of managerial support for unions are also 
associated with a lower probability of free-riding (Model (4)). However, HR practices were 
not significant when added to the baseline model, indicating that they were neither a 
substitute for nor complementary to unionization. 
In Model (5) all these variables are entered together. Little changes, although tenure with 
the employer loses its significance and employer neutrality becomes negative and significant 
at a 90 per cent confidence level. 
Within this pooled sample, the free-riding rate is 38 percent, with the rate around 10 
percentage points higher for New Zealanders than British employees. Thus, when added to a 
constant, the New Zealand dummy has a marginal effect of 0.10. In Model (1) this has risen 
to 0.15 indicating that compositional differences between employees in the two countries 
obscures what is an even higher underlying free-riding probability in New Zealand. The size 
of this effect does not change when the needs scale is added. However, the marginal effect of 
the New Zealand dummy increases to 0.21 when union effectiveness is controlled for, 
reflecting the fact that unions are perceived as more effective in New Zealand than they are in 
Britain. Controlling for this, the propensity to free-ride grows in New Zealand relative to 
Britain. In Model (4), when perceptions of management attitudes to unions are added to the 
baseline model, the marginal effect of New Zealand falls a little compared with Model (1). 
This is because managerial opposition to unions, which is more widespread in New Zealand 
than in Britain, accounts for some of the free-rider gap so that, when it is accounted for, the 
gap narrows a little. In the full model the marginal effect of New Zealand is 0.17, indicating a 
sizeable difference in free-rider propensities that is not accounted for by other factors in the 
model. 
Table 5 presents identically specified separate models for New Zealand and Britain so that 
coefficients are no longer constrained to be equivalent across the two countries. (The full 
models are presented in Appendix Table A3). For ease of presentation the marginal effects 
are only presented for the baseline and full models in Table 5. 
Permitting coefficients to differ across countries allows the contrasting effects of gender, 
apparent in the descriptive analyses, to come through. The positive association between being 
male and free-riding in New Zealand is large and becomes even stronger in the full model 
(Model (3)). The independent effect of gender is weaker in Britain and the negative effect of 
being male, apparent in the baseline model, becomes non-significant in the full model. The 
positive relationship between youth and free-riding is apparent for both countries, but it is 
stronger in New Zealand than in Britain.  Independent associations with ethnicity, 
qualifications, pay, and career jobs are weak and not robust to model specification. Hours 
effects are common across both countries, whereas negative associations with long tenure and 
large organizations are confined to Britain. The probability of free-riding is higher among 
managers than among non-managerial employees in both New Zealand and Britain, 
something that is not apparent in the descriptive analyses, the marginal effect being similar in 
both countries. 
In both countries, higher needs and perceptions of more effective unions are independently 
associated with lower probabilities of free-riding, while substitutes are not significant. 
Whereas managerial opposition to unions was more widespread in New Zealand than Britain, 
it is only independently associated with free-riding in Britain. 
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We ran further models to establish the independent effect of variables that were only 
available for one country or the other. These models (available from the author on request) 
examined the role played by ideological convictions, a wider list of substitutes for trade 
unions, and the effect of union density within the workplace. As expected, a general belief 
that strong unions are needed to protect working conditions and wages, and the belief that 
unions are not old fashioned but have a future in Britain are both negatively associated with 
free-riding. The ‘left-right’ scale, on the other hand, is not significantly associated with free-
riding in New Zealand, whether entered as a linear term, a linear term with a quadratic term, 
or as quartiles of the distribution. Turning to potential substitutes for unionization, the only 
practice that is significant in Britain is the positive effect of performance-related pay. For 
New Zealand, the only significant association is a negative one between free-riding and 
regular meetings between management and employees. Finally, as anticipated, higher 
workplace union density has a strong independent effect in reducing the probability of free-
riding in New Zealand. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Free-riders are an increasing problem for trades unions in Britain and New Zealand following 
legislation in the late 1980s and early 1990s that made enforcement of a closed shop 
unlawful. Using unique comparable data for the two countries, we find the incidence of free-
riding is 10 percentage points higher in New Zealand than it is in Britain. The regression-
adjusted gap is even larger. 
Non-members give a range of reasons for not joining their workplace union. These include 
the explicit recognition of the incentive to free-ride on the collective goods the union 
produces, but they also include concerns about the net benefits of joining due to union 
ineffectiveness, social norms in not joining, and the pecuniary cost of joining. Multivariate 
analyses reveal patterns of free-riding consistent with a number of theoretical propositions. 
Variance in the social custom of joining across sectors and occupations may explain higher 
probabilities of free-riding among managers and lower probabilities of free-riding in the 
public sector and in high density workplaces. A concern for unions is that, with the end of the 
closed shop and the ensuing decline in union density, it is increasingly the case that the social 
custom is not to join the union. 
The number of problems or needs non-members have in unionized workplaces is similar in 
Britain and New Zealand. In both countries, the more problems workers have, the less likely 
they are to free-ride, the size of the effect being similar. This implies that workers are not 
blaming unions for the parlous state of their workplace but, instead, may see unions as part of 
the solution. Consistent with this, perceptions of union instrumentality are associated with 
lower probabilities of free-riding. This is good news for unions since it implies that, at least to 
some degree, converting non-members located in unionized workplaces is something within 
their control. However, a high percentage of workers in both countries do not view unions as 
effective in delivering better outcomes for workers. On average, employees in New Zealand 
viewed unions as more effective than their British counterparts. However, the difference was 
accounted for by the perceptions of existing members: perceptions of non-members were 
similar. The implication is that unions in both countries could do much more to improve 
worker perceptions that they can help ‘fix’ problems at work. 
Perhaps some time ago, unions may have hoped that employees’ ideological attachment to 
trades unionism would be sufficient to guarantee loyalty to the union. This may no longer be 
the case, but ideological attachment remains a significant factor reducing the propensity to 
free-ride in Britain. The evidence for New Zealand is less clear-cut. 
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In the US, it is often argued that intractable employer opposition to unionization prevents 
unions from gaining a foothold, resulting in frustrated demand for unionization (Bryson and 
Freeman 2005). In this paper, we find evidence that employers can also have an important 
role to play in employees’ decisions to join a union even when the union already has a 
foothold. Although employees perceive management to be less tolerant of unions in New 
Zealand than they do in Britain, the independent association between free-riding and 
management opposition to unions is only significant for Britain. It may well be the case that 
there is some misalignment between employee perceptions of employer attitudes towards 
unionization and employers’ professed attitudes. Nevertheless, what matters in terms of 
employees’ decisions about union joining is their own perception of management attitudes, as 
we find here.   
In both countries, evidence that HR policies and practices can substitute for unions is 
scant. In Britain, the only practice associated with an increased propensity to free-ride was 
performance-related pay whereas, in New Zealand, the only practice significantly associated 
with free-riding was regular meetings between management and employees, the effect being 
to reduce the probability of free-riding. 
Whereas the New Zealand government has recognized the free-rider problem facing 
unions by introducing legislation in support of agency shops, this is not an area that the 
British government plans to legislate on. Indeed, it recently stated: 
 
“The Government believes every employee should be free to decide to join a trade union. But 
equally every employee should be free not to join. Trade unions should be voluntary 
organisations. The abolition of the closed shop was one of the many employment law reforms 
of the 1980s that were justified and will remain. There will be no return to the closed shop.” 
(http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/fairness/part4.htm) 
 
It is against this background that trade unions in Britain have just begun to secure agency 
shop agreements through workplace votes. One of the first such agreements was secured by 
the Transport and General Workers Union in June 2005. According to Tony Woodley, 
General Secretary of the TGWU: 
 
"The deal with East Thames Buses, accepted by a ballot of the entire workforce, should 
prove to be a model for workplaces all over the country. Already, several non-members 
realise what the union does for them and are now joining." 
(http://www.tgwu.org.uk/Templates/Journal.asp?NodeID=91782&int1stParentNodeID=4246
9&int2ndParentNodeID=89440) 
 
Whether New Zealand’s new legislative framework and Britain’s voluntary agreements 
can increase the percentage of workers paying union dues, or re-weight the cost/benefit 
calculus in favour of union joining remains to be seen. 
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Table 1: % non-members in unionized workplaces, Britain, 1980-2001 
 
 1980s 1990s 
 1980 1983-85 1984 1986-89 1990 1990-94 1995-98 1998 1999-01 
WERS 22 - 28 - 32 - - 44 - 
BSAS - 28 - 27 - 32 37 - 40 
 
Sources: WERS adapted from Millward et al. (2000: 142). Establishments with 25+ 
employees where one or more unions recognized for pay bargaining and where number of 
members reported. 1980 figure is full-time employees only. 
 
BSAS adapted from Bryson and Gomez, 2005, Table 8.  Employees working 10+ hours per 
week. 
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Table 2: The incidence of free-riding among employees in unionized workplaces in 
Britain and New Zealand, by employee characteristics  
 
 Britain New Zealand 
All 35 45 
Sex: 
  Men 
  Women 
 
29 
42 
 
51 
38 
Age (years): 
  15-24 
  25-34 
  35-44 
  45-54 
  55+ 
 
64 
39 
28 
27 
27 
 
76 
56 
39 
40 
40 
Ethnicity: 
  White 
  Non-white 
 
35 
30 
 
45 
42 
Qualifications: 
  Low 
  Middle 
  High 
 
36 
37 
31 
 
50 
42 
42 
Hours worked: 
  <30 
  30-40 
  >40 
 
57 
34 
23 
 
62 
47 
36 
Tenure with employer: 
  <2 years 
  2-4 years 
  5-9 years 
  10+ years 
 
52 
44 
32 
23 
 
54 
49 
45 
36 
Career job: 
  Yes 
  No 
 
32 
43 
 
41 
53 
Manager: 
  Yes 
  No 
 
46 
34 
 
42 
46 
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Supervisor: 
  Yes 
  No 
 
29 
39 
 
47 
41 
Pay: 
  Low 
  Middle 
  High 
  DK/refused 
 
56 
30 
23 
40 
 
65 
44 
39 
72 
Sector: 
  Public 
  Private 
 
28 
41 
 
34 
52 
Organizational size: 
  <=1,000 employees 
  >1,000 employees 
  DK size 
 
48 
30 
30 
 
53 
40 
33 
Needs: 
  0 
  1 or 2 
  3+ 
 
38 
40 
27 
 
46 
49 
38 
Workplace worse without union: 
  Yes 
  No/DK 
 
20 
52 
 
23 
70 
Union effectiveness score: 
  0 
  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  5 
  6 
 
53 
38 
33 
28 
18 
32 
33 
 
76 
65 
61 
41 
28 
30 
34 
Management attitudes: 
  Favours union 
  Neutral 
  Opposes union 
  Don’t know 
 
25 
40 
40 
58 
 
32 
48 
51 
54 
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Substitutes: 
  HR department 
  Open door 
  JCC 
 
32 
37 
33 
 
41 
44 
43 
Variables only available in one of the countries: 
Union substitutes: 
  Grievance procedure 
  Profit-related pay 
  ESOP 
  SAYE 
  Performance-related pay 
  Cash bonuses 
  DK about performance pay 
  Regular meetings with management 
  Employee committee 
  EI program 
 
28 
41 
35 
32 
49 
30 
66 
NA 
NA 
NA 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
38 
42 
39 
Trade union modern 
  Yes 
  No 
 
20 
43 
 
NA 
Need strong union: 
  Yes 
  No 
 
23 
47 
 
NA 
Left-right scale quartiles: 
  Bottom quartile 
  Second quartile 
  Third quartile 
  Top quartile 
 
NA 
 
39 
42 
46 
53 
Union density at the workplace: 
  Almost all/all 
  A clear majority 
  About half 
  A small minority 
  Almost none 
  Don’t know   
 
NA 
 
12 
32 
56 
72 
88 
78 
 
Notes:  (1) Unweighted N=1,088, 646 British, 442 New Zealanders  (2) Figures are weighted 
with survey weights.  (3) Details of data derivation are given in the Data Appendix. 
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Table 3: Factors influencing British employees’ decisions not to join a union they were 
eligible to join 
Panel A: Row Percentages  
 Very 
important
Quite 
important 
Not very 
important 
Not at all 
important 
Don’t 
know 
Fee too high/ too 
expensive 
8 22 23 35 12 
People doing my job just 
don’t join 
7 21 33 34 5 
Union does not achieve 
anything I value 
10 29 31 21 10 
I get all the benefits 
anyway 
12 22 31 24 11 
 
Source: BWRPS Q42.  N=239 
 
 
Panel B: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 
 
 Fees too high People in my 
job just don’t 
join 
Union doesn’t 
achieve 
anything 
I get all the 
benefits 
anyway 
Fees too high 1.00 - - - 
People in my 
job just don’t 
join 
.165 
(.017) 
1.00 - - 
Union doesn’t 
achieve 
anything 
.237 
(.001) 
.332 
(.000) 
1.00 - 
I get all the 
benefits 
anyway 
.240 
(.001) 
.316 
(.000) 
.263 
(.000) 
1.00 
 
Source: BWRPS Q42.  Spearman’s rank rho correlation coefficients for respondents other 
than those replying ‘don’t know’.  Statistical significance of correlation in parentheses 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects, free-riding in Britain and New Zealand, pooled 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Mean predicted value of being a non-
member 
0.37 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.37 
New Zealand (ref.: Britain) 0.15 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.17 
 (3.14)*** (3.07)*** (4.05)*** (2.70)*** (3.21)*** 
Age (ref.: aged 35-44 years)      
15-24 years 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.25 
 (3.29)*** (3.18)*** (3.49)*** (3.34)*** (3.37)*** 
25-34 years 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 
 (1.99)** (2.00)** (1.92)* (1.79)* (1.85)* 
Hours (ref.: 30-40 hours)      
<30 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.15 
 (2.85)*** (2.68)*** (2.55)** (3.07)*** (2.46)** 
>40 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 
 (2.75)*** (2.63)*** (2.89)*** (2.54)** (2.58)*** 
Tenure with employer (ref.: < 2 
years) 
     
10+ years -0.11 -0.09 ns -0.11 ns 
 (1.94)* (1.66)* (1.06) (1.98)** (0.62) 
Manager (ref.: non-manager) 0.10 0.09 ns 0.11 ns 
 (1.69)* (1.66)* (1.36) (1.95)* (1.41) 
Pay (ref.: low)      
Medium -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 
 (2.28)** (2.23)** (2.16)** (2.34)** (2.11)** 
High -0.15 -0.15 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 
 (2.24)** (2.26)** (2.57)** (2.44)** (2.63)*** 
Public sector (ref.: private) -0.17 -0.18 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 
 (4.20)*** (4.21)*** (3.74)*** (3.94)*** (3.53)*** 
Organzation with 1000+ employees 
(ref:<1,000) 
-0.13 -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.08 
 (3.31)*** (3.18)*** (2.31)** (3.17)*** (1.85)* 
Needs scale  -0.01   -0.03 
  (1.90)*   (3.74)*** 
Union effectiveness scale   -0.04  -0.05 
   (4.73)***  (5.13)*** 
Workplace would be worse without 
union (ref.: would be better/no 
different) 
  -0.31  -0.29 
   (8.60)***  (8.11)*** 
Perceptions of management 
attitudes towards unions (ref.: 
opposed) 
     
In favour    -0.17 -0.17 
    (3.07)*** (2.94)*** 
Neutral    ns -0.11 
    (0.42) (1.90)* 
 
Notes: 
(1) Full models are reported in the Data Appendix. 
(2) N=1,088 
(3) Coefficients are marginal effects estimated at the mean weighted values for the estimation 
sample.  T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *=significant at 90% level.  **=significant 
at 95% level ***=significant at 99% level. 
(4) The actual weighted mean for non-membership in the estimation sample is 0.38. 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects, free-riding, separate country models 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) Full models are reported in the Data Appendix. 
(2) N=646 for British models and 442 for New Zealand models. 
(3) Coefficients are marginal effects estimated at the mean weighted values for the estimation sample.  T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. *=significant at 90% level.  **=significant at 95% level ***=significant 
at 99% level. 
(4) The actual weighted mean for non-membership is 35% Britain and 45% New Zealand. 
 (1) NZ (2) Britain (3) NZ (4) Britain 
Mean predicted value of being a non-member 0.46 0.32 0.45 0.28 
Male (ref.: female) 0.17 -0.08 0.25 ns 
 (2.48)** (1.86)* (3.40)*** (1.09) 
Age (ref.: 35-44 years)     
15-24 years 0.28 0.20 0.32 0.20 
 (2.08)** (2.44)** (2.34)** (2.40)** 
25-34 years 0.22 ns 0.22 ns 
 (2.54)** (1.11) (2.38)** (0.90) 
Non-white (ref.: white) -0.13 -0.13 ns ns 
 (1.67)* (1.70)* (1.42) (1.53) 
Qualifications (ref.: low)     
Medium ns ns ns ns 
 (0.76) (0.29) (0.14) (0.25) 
High ns ns ns 0.12 
 (1.05) (0.95) (0.17) (1.89)* 
Hours (ref.: 30-40)     
<30 0.19 0.15 ns 0.19 
 (1.78)* (2.42)** (0.03) (2.85)*** 
>40 -0.17 -0.09 -0.20 -0.09 
 (2.37)** (1.74)* (2.52)** (1.73)* 
10+ years tenure (ref.: <2 years) ns -0.15 ns -0.10 
 (0.64) (2.50)** (0.24) (1.61)* 
Career job (ref.: not part of long-term career) ns ns -0.16 ns 
 (1.16) (0.70) (1.86)* (0.89) 
Manager (ref.: non-manager) 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.17 
 (2.07)** (2.18)** (1.61)* (2.07)** 
Supervisor (ref.: not supervisor) 0.15 ns ns -0.08 
 (2.09)** (1.35) (1.18) (1.82)* 
Pay (ref.: low)     
Medium ns -0.11* ns ns 
 (0.51) (1.80) (1.11) (1.41) 
High ns -0.12 ns -0.13 
 (0.82) (1.63)* (1.38) (1.78)* 
Public sector (ref.: private) -0.23 -0.16 -0.19 -0.14 
 (2.81)*** (3.34)*** (2.40)** (3.02)*** 
Organization with 1000+ employees (ref.: <1,000) ns -0.15 ns -0.08 
 (1.36) (3.19)*** (1.21) (1.79)* 
Needs scale   -0.04 -0.03 
   (2.67)*** (3.09)*** 
Perceived management attitudes to unions (ref.: opposition)     
In favour   ns -0.14 
   (1.55) (1.98)** 
Neutral   ns ns 
   (1.34) (0.98) 
Union effectiveness scale   -0.07 -0.04 
   (3.73)*** (4.00)*** 
Workplace would be worse without union (ref.: would be 
better/no different) 
  -0.39 -0.24 
   (5.68)*** (5.60)*** 
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Data Appendix  
 
‘Baseline’ control variables 
 
The baseline characteristics that are identical in the two surveys are: sex, age, hours worked 
(usual weekly including overtime or extra hours), employer tenure, career job, and 
organizational size.   
In BWRPS managers are ‘managers and senior administrators’ whereas, in NZWRPS they 
are ‘managers or professionals in a position requiring a university degree’. Supervisors are 
those answering ‘yes’ to the question: ‘As an official part of your (main) job, do you 
supervise the work of other employees or tell other employees what to do?’ The NZWRPS 
measure is identical but uses the phrase ‘supervise or manage’ in place of ‘supervise’. The 
broader questions in NZWRPS explain the higher incidence of managers and supervisors in 
New Zealand compared with Britain.  
The ‘white’ group in New Zealand is ‘New Zealand European/Pakeha’; in Britain it’s 
‘white’.  
The questions relating to qualifications are not comparable, so we construct measures of 
‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ qualifications. In BWRPS, employees are asked for their ‘highest 
educational qualification’. ‘Low’ includes qualifications up to GCSE-level, including no 
qualifications; ‘medium’ is A-level or equivalent and ‘high’ is degree of post-graduate 
degree-level. The ‘Other’ qualifications category is subsumed into the ‘low’ qualifications 
category in the multivariate analyses. In NZWRPS, employees are asked for their ‘highest 
level of education’. ‘Low’ qualifications are those below 6th Form Certificate; ‘medium’ 
includes 6th Form Certificate, a ‘bursary or equivalent’, ‘technical or trade certificate’ and 
‘tertiary diploma’. ‘High’ includes degrees and post-graduate degrees. 
BWRPS asks employees for their gross pay per week or year using twelve bands. ‘Low’ 
pay is defined as under £201 per week; ‘medium’ pay is £201-£400 per week; ‘high’ pay is 
over £400 per week. NZWRPS, on the other hand, asks for ‘total personal income before 
tax’. This is labelled ‘pay’ for convenience, with ‘low’ pay being up to $20,000 per annum; 
‘medium’ being $20,000 up to $40,000 per annum, and ‘high’ being $40,000 per annum and 
above. 
Neither data set contains a public sector identifier. In BWRPS ‘public’ is proxied by a 
dummy variable scoring ‘1’ if the industry is ‘Public Administration, Civil Service or 
Defence’, ‘Education’, ‘Health and Social Work’ or ‘Community, Social and Personal 
Services or Membership Organizations’. In NZWRPS, ‘public’ is proxied by the dummy 
industry variable scoring ‘1’ if the industry is ‘Government Administration and Defence’, 
‘Education’, ‘Health and Social Work’ or ‘Community, Social and Personal Services’. 
 
Index of ‘needs’ 
 
This additive index, which is identical in both surveys, counts one point for each of the 
following: every time a respondent gave management a D or F grade in relation to 
‘promoting equal opportunities for women and ethnic minorities’, ‘understanding and 
knowledge of the business’, ‘keeping everyone up to date with proposed changes’, ‘concern 
for employees’, ‘willingness to share power and authority with employees in the workplace’, 
‘making work interesting and enjoyable’, ‘giving fair pay increases and bonuses’. A point 
was also added each time respondents disagreed with the statements ‘managers here are 
understanding about employees having to meet family responsibilities’, ‘people here are 
encouraged to develop their skills’, and ‘my job is secure in this workplace’. A point was also 
added when employees rated management-employee relations as ‘poor’, they did not ‘trust 
your employer to keep its promises to you and other employees…at all’, and when they were 
not satisfied with their ‘influence…in company decisions that affect your job or work life’. 
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Substitutes 
 
Three substitutes measured in both surveys are three dummy variables indicating the presence 
of ‘a personnel or Human Resources department’ (NZWRPS refers to a ‘department or 
person’), an ‘open door policy so employees can tell senior management about problems with 
their supervisors’, and the presence of a ‘committee of management and employees who meet 
regularly to consult over workplace issues’. 
The policies only available in BWRPS are: ‘a formal grievance procedure’ and five non-
standard forms of payment, namely ‘payments or bonuses related to the profits made by your 
employer’, ‘an employee share ownership scheme’, a ‘save-as-you-earn (SAYE) scheme’, 
‘individual or group performance-related pay’ and ‘any other cash bonuses’. 
The policies only available in NZWRPS are: ‘regular meetings with all staff’; ‘a 
committee of employees that discusses problems with management on a regular basis’ and 
‘an employee involvement program such as quality circles’.  
 
Employee perceptions of management attitudes to unionization 
 
The BWRPS measure uses responses to the question: ‘How would you rate the attitude of 
your management at your workplace towards unions (or similar bodies). Are your 
managers…in favour of unions, neutral about unions, or opposed to trade unions?’ 
The NZWRPS uses responses to the question: ‘Would you say managers are…in favour of 
unions, neutral about unions, or opposed to unions?’ 
 
Union instrumentality 
 
In BWRPS, unions scored ‘1’ every time they were viewed as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ on each 
of six items: 
- ‘winning fair pay increases and bonuses’ 
- ‘understanding and knowledge of your employer’s business’ 
- ‘being open and accountable to its members’ 
- ‘working with management to increase quality or productivity’ 
- ‘making work interesting and enjoyable’ 
- ‘protecting workers against unfair treatment’. 
 
The second measure of union instrumentality in BWRPS is a dummy variable scoring ‘1’ 
when respondents answered ‘a little worse’ or ‘a lot worse’ to the question: ‘Do you think 
your workplace would be a better or worse place to work if there was no union or would it 
make no difference?’ 
The NZWRPS additive scale is constructed using measures identical to those constructed 
for BWRPS except that the quality/productivity item uses the word ‘improve’ instead of 
‘increase’. 
The NWRPS dummy variable on the difference union removal would make is similar to 
the BWRPS measure, except the question relates to ‘you personally’ instead of ‘your 
workplace’. 
 
Ideology 
 
For BWRPS, ideological orientation towards unions was measured with two variables. The 
first, is a dummy variable scoring ‘1’ where respondents ‘strongly agree’ with the statement 
‘Strong trade unions are needed to protect the working conditions and wages of employees’. 
The second is a dummy scoring ‘1’ where respondents ‘strongly disagree’ with the statement 
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‘trade unions are old fashioned’ or ‘trade unions have no future in modern Britain’, 
depending on to which of these two statements they were randomly assigned. 
The NZWRPS measure of ideology is based on factor analysis of five political attitude 
statements: 
- ‘management always tries to get the better of employees’ 
- ‘big business benefits owners at the expense of employees’ 
- ‘there is one law for the rich and another for the poor’ 
- ‘ordinary working people don’t get a fair share of the nation’s wealth’ 
- ‘government should redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor’. 
 
Responses were coded on a 5-point scale from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. 
They are used to construct a ‘left-right’ index which positions individuals on a political 
spectrum from left to right. Principal components analysis revealed a factor with an 
eigenvalue of 2.4 accounting for 47 percent of variance in responses to the five questions. 
Standardizing the items, the average inter-item correlation is 0.33 and the Cronbach’s alpha 
scale reliability coefficient is 0.71. The scale runs from -1.34 to 1.67, with lower scores 
indicating more ‘left-wing’. 
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Appendix Table A1: Mean scores for independent variables used in multivariate 
analyses  
 
 Britain New Zealand 
  Men  53 53 
Age (years): 
  15-24 
  25-34 
  35-44 
  45-54 
  55+ 
 
11 
27 
28 
24 
10 
 
5 
19 
32 
25 
19 
Ethnicity: 
  Non-white 
 
6 
 
20 
Qualifications: 
  Low 
  Middle 
  High 
  Other 
 
45 
19 
31 
5 
 
31 
38 
32 
NA 
Hours worked: 
  <30 
  30-40 
  >40 
 
18 
52 
30 
 
14 
42 
44 
Tenure with employer: 
  <2 years 
  2-4 years 
  5-9 years 
  10+ years 
 
16 
27 
17 
40 
 
16 
28 
22 
34 
Career job  77 69 
Manager 8 31 
Supervisor 42 59 
Pay: 
  Low 
  Middle 
  High 
  DK/refused 
 
23 
40 
29 
7 
 
12 
42 
44 
1 
  Public sector 49 44 
Organizational size: 
  <=1,000 employees 
 
23 
 
40 
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  >1,000 employees 
  DK size 
73 
4 
34 
26 
Needs 2.4 2.1 
Workplace worse without union 54 54 
Union effectiveness score 2.8 3.4 
Management attitudes: 
  Favours union 
  Neutral 
  Opposes union 
  Don’t know 
 
41 
44 
10 
5 
 
31 
38 
24 
7 
Substitutes: 
  HR department 
  Open door 
  JCC 
 
54 
58 
67 
 
70 
85 
61 
Variables only available in one of the countries: 
Need strong union: 
  Yes 
 
51 
 
NA 
Trade union modern 
  Yes 
 
36 
 
NA 
Union density at the workplace: 
  Almost all/all 
  A clear majority 
  About half 
  A small minority 
  Almost none 
  Don’t know   
 
NA 
 
29 
22 
17 
16 
7 
9 
Left-right scale quartiles: 
  Bottom quartile 
  Second quartile 
  Third quartile 
  Top quartile 
 
NA 
 
30 
24 
22 
24 
Union substitutes: 
  Grievance procedure 
  Profit-related pay 
  ESOP 
  SAYE 
  Performance-related pay 
  Cash bonuses 
 
54 
22 
12 
9 
10 
11 
 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
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  DK about performance pay 
  Regular meetings with management 
  Employee committee 
  EI program 
<1 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
63 
55 
42 
 
Notes: 
(1) Unweighted N=1,088, 646 British, 442 New Zealanders. 
(2) Figures are weighted with survey weights.  This explains why the distribution of the ‘left-
right’ scale quartiles are not evenly distributed. 
(3) Details of data derivation are given in the Data Appendix. 
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Appendix Table A2: Full probit models for free-riding, pooled  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NZ 0.391 0.383 0.549 0.561 0.392 0.380 0.338 0.459 0.477 
 (3.14)** (3.07)** (4.05)** (4.18)** (3.05)** (2.91)** (2.70)** (3.21)** (3.36)** 
Male 0.021 0.043 0.087 0.088 0.021 0.019 0.022 0.113 0.109 
 (0.20) (0.41) (0.77) (0.77) (0.19) (0.17) (0.21) (1.02) (0.98) 
Age 1524 0.599 0.579 0.665 0.650 0.599 0.599 0.612 0.644 0.636 
 (3.29)** (3.18)** (3.49)** (3.42)** (3.29)** (3.28)** (3.34)** (3.37)** (3.33)** 
Age 2534 0.257 0.259 0.258 0.243 0.257 0.260 0.233 0.251 0.233 
 (1.99)* (2.00)* (1.92) (1.82) (1.99)* (2.03)* (1.79) (1.85) (1.73) 
Age 4554 0.089 0.107 0.031 0.021 0.089 0.088 0.115 0.072 0.059 
 (0.69) (0.83) (0.23) (0.16) (0.69) (0.68) (0.88) (0.53) (0.44) 
Age 55+ -0.087 -0.094 -0.094 -0.098 -0.087 -0.090 -0.063 -0.104 -0.116 
 (0.57) (0.63) (0.59) (0.61) (0.57) (0.59) (0.42) (0.64) (0.72) 
Ethnic -0.242 -0.251 -0.178 -0.195 -0.241 -0.237 -0.284 -0.214 -0.227 
 (1.51) (1.53) (1.02) (1.14) (1.50) (1.48) (1.73) (1.20) (1.29) 
Ed Mid -0.023 -0.022 -0.015 0.024 -0.023 -0.019 0.016 0.041 0.073 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.11) (0.18) (0.18) (0.15) (0.13) (0.31) (0.55) 
Ed High 0.030 0.019 0.200 0.234 0.031 0.045 0.095 0.239 0.268 
 (0.22) (0.14) (1.36) (1.62) (0.22) (0.33) (0.69) (1.62) (1.83) 
Hrs <30 0.395 0.373 0.399 0.390 0.396 0.383 0.428 0.385 0.380 
 (2.85)** (2.68)** (2.55)* (2.49)* (2.85)** (2.74)** (3.07)** (2.46)* (2.41)* 
Hrs >40 -0.309 -0.299 -0.336 -0.354 -0.309 -0.313 -0.290 -0.306 -0.322 
 (2.75)** (2.63)** (2.89)** (3.05)** (2.75)** (2.77)** (2.54)* (2.58)** (2.73)** 
Tenure 2-4 0.015 0.045 0.094 0.131 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.146 0.178 
 (0.11) (0.32) (0.63) (0.87) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.95) (1.16) 
Tenure5-9 -0.080 -0.038 0.005 0.044 -0.080 -0.075 -0.077 0.080 0.115 
 (0.50) (0.24) (0.03) (0.26) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.65) 
Tenure10+ -0.291 -0.251 -0.176 -0.153 -0.290 -0.279 -0.301 -0.106 -0.081 
 (1.94) (1.66) (1.06) (0.92) (1.93) (1.83) (1.98)* (0.62) (0.47) 
Career 0.001 -0.056 0.050 0.045 0.001 -0.012 0.040 -0.041 -0.039 
 (0.00) (0.46) (0.40) (0.37) (0.01) (0.10) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) 
Manager 0.246 0.240 0.203 0.224 0.246 0.256 0.283 0.210 0.228 
 (1.69) (1.66) (1.36) (1.51) (1.70) (1.77) (1.95) (1.41) (1.53) 
Supervisor 0.081 0.069 0.029 0.016 0.081 0.066 0.099 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.79) (0.67) (0.26) (0.14) (0.79) (0.64) (0.97) (0.05) (0.02) 
Pay Mid -0.326 -0.320 -0.331 -0.327 -0.325 -0.321 -0.338 -0.328 -0.330 
 (2.28)* (2.23)* (2.16)* (2.11)* (2.27)* (2.24)* (2.34)* (2.11)* (2.10)* 
Pay Hi -0.400 -0.405 -0.485 -0.441 -0.400 -0.390 -0.440 -0.501 -0.466 
 (2.24)* (2.26)* (2.57)* (2.32)* (2.23)* (2.17)* (2.44)* (2.63)** (2.43)* 
Pay DK 0.001 -0.025 -0.139 -0.179 0.001 0.015 -0.053 -0.224 -0.275 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.58) (0.73) (0.01) (0.07) (0.25) (0.94) (1.14) 
Public -0.469 -0.472 -0.432 -0.440 -0.469 -0.470 -0.441 -0.408 -0.419 
 (4.20)** (4.21)** (3.74)** (3.81)** (4.20)** (4.21)** (3.94)** (3.53)** (3.63)** 
Size 1000+ -0.358 -0.344 -0.260 -0.228 -0.357 -0.343 -0.343 -0.213 -0.182 
 (3.31)** (3.18)** (2.31)* (2.03)* (3.26)** (3.12)** (3.17)** (1.85) (1.60) 
Size DK -0.611 -0.611 -0.522 -0.537 -0.611 -0.607 -0.605 -0.495 -0.512 
 (3.60)** (3.56)** (2.94)** (3.06)** (3.58)** (3.58)** (3.53)** (2.76)** (2.87)** 
Needs  -0.034      -0.075 -0.075 
  (1.90)      (3.74)** (3.80)** 
Union 
effectiveness 
  -0.119     -0.136  
   (4.73)**     (5.13)**  
Man fav.       -0.460 -0.483 -0.487 
       (3.07)** (2.94)** (3.03)** 
Man neut.       -0.061 -0.288 -0.284 
       (0.42) (1.90) (1.93) 
Man DK       0.209 -0.026 -0.044 
       (0.89) (0.11) (0.19) 
 30
Hr Dept      -0.068  -0.003 -0.002 
      (0.67)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Open door      0.091  0.043 0.037 
      (0.86)  (0.38) (0.33) 
Jcc       -0.015  -0.040 -0.056 
      (0.15)  (0.38) (0.53) 
Get worse   -0.856 -0.831    -0.801 -0.778 
   (8.60)** (8.46)**    (8.11)** (7.91)** 
Substitutes     -0.002     
     (0.04)     
Constant 0.250 0.331 0.762 0.780 0.252 0.236 0.360 1.222 1.255 
 (1.11) (1.44) (3.19)** (3.28)** (1.08) (1.01) (1.42) (4.22)** (4.36)** 
Observations 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 1088 
 
Notes. (1) Probit coefficients with t-stats in parentheses.  *= sig at 95%; **=sig at 99% (2) 
Reference categories are: Britain; Female; aged 35-44; non-white; low education; 30-40 
hours; <2 years tenure; not career job; non-manager; not supervisor; low pay; organization 
<1k employees; management opposed to union; no HR department; no open door; no JCC; 
same/better without union. 
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Appendix Table A3: Full probit models for free-riding, separate country models 
 
 (1) NZ (2) Br (11) NZ (12) Br 
Male 0.442 -0.248 0.642 -0.150 
 (2.48)* (1.86) (3.40)** (1.09) 
Age 1524 0.730 0.521 0.853 0.540 
 (2.08)* (2.44)* (2.34)* (2.40)* 
Age 2534 0.549 0.178 0.580 0.148 
 (2.54)* (1.11) (2.38)* (0.90) 
Age 4554 0.117 0.126 0.013 0.118 
 (0.56) (0.79) (0.06) (0.69) 
Age 55+ 0.072 -0.108 -0.015 -0.065 
 (0.31) (0.56) (0.06) (0.31) 
Ethnic -0.344 -0.400 -0.338 -0.398 
 (1.67) (1.70) (1.42) (1.53) 
Ed Mid -0.160 0.047 0.034 0.043 
 (0.76) (0.29) (0.14) (0.25) 
Ed High -0.282 0.154 0.055 0.330 
 (1.05) (0.95) (0.17) (1.89) 
Hrs <30 0.487 0.398 -0.010 0.512 
 (1.78) (2.42)* (0.03) (2.85)** 
Hrs >40 -0.438 -0.252 -0.509 -0.263 
 (2.37)* (1.74) (2.52)* (1.73) 
Tenure 2-4 0.189 -0.096 0.291 0.019 
 (0.78) (0.56) (1.03) (0.11) 
Tenure5-9 0.110 -0.234 0.243 -0.126 
 (0.42) (1.19) (0.77) (0.60) 
Tenure10+ -0.169 -0.449 0.076 -0.315 
 (0.64) (2.50)* (0.24) (1.61) 
Career -0.240 0.097 -0.403 0.130 
 (1.16) (0.70) (1.86) (0.89) 
Manager 0.482 0.499 0.443 0.472 
 (2.07)* (2.18)* (1.61) (2.07)* 
Supervisor 0.368 -0.173 0.240 -0.245 
 (2.09)* (1.35) (1.18) (1.82) 
Pay Mid -0.148 -0.303 -0.345 -0.260 
 (0.51) (1.80) (1.11) (1.41) 
Pay Hi -0.286 -0.356 -0.519 -0.414 
 (0.82) (1.63) (1.38) (1.78) 
Pay DK 0.200 0.050 -0.253 -0.107 
 (0.33) (0.22) (0.38) (0.41) 
Public -0.584 -0.443 -0.493 -0.417 
 (2.81)** (3.34)** (2.40)* (3.02)** 
Size 1000+ -0.274 -0.416 -0.267 -0.244 
 (1.36) (3.19)** (1.21) (1.79) 
Size DK -0.636 -0.633 -0.440 -0.726 
 (3.19)** (2.24)* (2.14)* (2.34)* 
Needs   -0.101 -0.077 
   (2.67)** (3.09)** 
Man fav.   -0.402 -0.436 
   (1.55) (1.98)* 
Man neut.   -0.304 -0.198 
   (1.34) (0.98) 
Man DK    0.221 -0.032 
   (0.58) (0.10) 
Union effectiveness   -0.183 -0.130 
   (3.73)** (4.00)** 
Get worse   -1.010 -0.702 
   (5.68)** (5.60)** 
HR department   -0.158 0.073 
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   (0.79) (0.58) 
Open door   -0.089 0.059 
   (0.37) (0.47) 
JCC   0.112 -0.084 
   (0.62) (0.65) 
Constant 0.224 0.482 1.915 1.261 
 (0.53) (1.82) (3.41)** (3.69)** 
Observations 442 646 442 646 
 
Notes. (1) Probit coefficients with t-stats in parentheses.  *= sig at 95%; **=sig at 99% (2) 
Reference categories are: Female; aged 35-44; non-white; low education; 30-40 hours; <2 
years tenure; not career job; non-manager; not supervisor; low pay; organization <1k 
employees; management opposed to union; no HR department; no open door; no JCC; 
same/better without union. 
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